1812 - Napoleon's Fatal March On Moscow - Adam Zamoyski

A while ago, I read Adam Zamoyski's superb study of the Vienna Peace Conference, "Rites Of Peace", and this encouraged me to seek out another work of his concerning the Napoleonic period, "1812 - Napoleon's Fatal March On Moscow".

 

 

 

Zamoyski starts by setting the scene, particularly the respective paths to 1812 followed by Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I, following the peace of Tilsit. Disaffection with Napoleon was growing among his "allies", much goodwill having been forfeited by heavy-handedness and a misunderstanding of the feelings of others. The pretensions of Alexander are illustrated, in so many ways a man of his time, espousing progressive sentiments, but hamstrung by the perilous nature of his own position, and the constant need to take heed of opinions at home.

 

The author also provides a handy guide to how the Continental System began to unravel, and also makes clear how important the whole Polish question was in the equation, something which is often overlooked. Also included in these preliminary chapters is an analysis of the Grande Armee, its strengths and shortcomings, how it had been diluted by attrition and campaigning, and also afflicted by corruption and decadence. 

 

The logistics of the invasion, when set out in their constituent parts, are staggering to contemplate in their intricacy and scale, when we consider that this was a pre-mechanization, pre-motorisation era. It would also seem that the stories about Napoleon's personal involvement in minute details are not exaggerated. It is also sobering to think that these daunting logistics to a large degree envisaged a short war.....

 

The great thing about books like this is that they tell the real story, without resorting to the generalisations and clichés prevalent in other media formats.  Here, for example, we learn that the much-vaunted Russian strategy was conditioned by a multiplicity of factors, and that it was not as calculating and pre-ordained as is sometimes made out, but evolved due to the pressure of events.

 

The elements of this book which I found most enlightening were those which addressed the infighting and tensions within Russian society and its "establishment", and how they affected the course of the campaign. Of the generals, Barclay de Tolly appeared to be largely vindicated in his approach, despite the vitriol aimed at him by many. Even after being "sacrificed", he continued to make astute observations.

 

The portrayal of Kutuzov here is also intriguing. For all his "inspirational" and galvanizing qualities, and his symbolic value, he seems to have been an equivocal influence on matters. The course of the conflict appeared to unfold despite rather than because of his conscious decisions. Indeed, some of the most favourable developments, from a Russian standpoint, occurred because they suppressed the urge to do what their instincts told them to.

 

Also, we get a look at the truth behind the level of patriotic and peasant engagement in the struggle, and the ambiguity which existed in the relationship of the masses with their leader. Even well into the long French retreat, opinion at all levels of Russian society was very volatile, and could have come down in opposition to Tsar Alexander.

 

What emerged to me was the fragility of the French enterprise, with a lack of central purpose and clear objectives, betrayed by Napoleon's stress on diplomacy and symbolic shows of power and unity.

It is probably simplistic to say that the Emperor's powers were on the wane, and some of his misfortunes he brought on himself by his flawed behaviour in the aftermath of Tilsit. The fall-out from this was reflected in the agonizing which afflicted him once on Russian soil. Political anxieties assailed him, and ironically the erratic and contradictory signals emanating from St. Petersburg may have harmed France more than they did the Russians, by thoroughly confusing and misleading Napoleon.

 

It is notable that most of the soldiers in his army still retained implicit faith in Napoleon, even during the most terrible travails. This was most likely due to a combination of blind faith, Bonaparte's remarkable track-record and his hypnotic allure. He was still capable of rising to the heights on occasion, as with the crossing of bridges on the return journey from Moscow, and his political antennae still functioned, if more fitfully than before. Another facet of the tale which stood out for me was how some of Napoleon's generals, Ney for example, retained their professionalism and focus amidst the chaos and misery.

The full horror and relentlessness of the Battle of Borodino is amply conveyed too. Reading those passages, one can fully appreciate why historians regard it as one of the most intensely brutal and horrific days of fighting ever seen. The full desperate ebb and flow of the battle comes across, as does the heart-chilling aftermath.

 

Needless to say, a sizeable portion of this book concentrates on the horrors and hardships suffered by both soldiers and civilians. Indeed, conditions during the initial invasion in the summer of 1812 sound terrible enough, as is testified by the figures of attrition. The retreat from Moscow is captured in all its shades, with stories of brutality and compassion, desperation and resilience, endurance and resignation. We are also shown how various "subcultures" developed, to cope with the cold, the lack of food and shelter, and the over-riding need to survive.

To conclude the book, the author summarizes the events which followed the French retreat from Russia, as the events and policies of 1807 onwards bore bitter fruit for Napoleon. There is a note of pessimism, with persuasive arguments about the more conservative path which European politics took after 1815, perhaps in reaction to the rise of nationalism and the newly aroused aspirations of the "lower orders".

This is an engrossing, diligently researched and beautifully written account of this momentous episode. One thing which occurred me increasingly as I worked my way through it was how little Europe in particular learned from the cruelties, callousness and sheer futility of what happened, as was made clear just over a century later.