There are innumerable books and documentaries out there, of varying credibility, but one of the most widely publicized documents on the subject is "Nato's Secret Armies", by the Swiss academic Daniele Ganser. Not a vast tome, but it gives a digestible and lucidly argued version of what occurred.
To summarise, the "Gladio" project stemmed from a desire by Western governments and intelligence services to install a network of "stay behind" agents and operatives in European countries in the aftermath of World War 2 , to provide information and engage in subversive activities in the event of a Soviet/Eastern Bloc invasion. It has been shown that these networks to varying degrees mutated or were co-opted, and turned their belligerence on political opponents, civilians and the fabric of society. "False flag" terrorist attacks were carried out, often by extreme right-wing groups, and were then falsely attributed to the radical left. It would seem that some of those in positions of power, in intelligence services for example, perpetrated cover-ups in order to protect the existence of the "Gladio" system, and also to shield acolytes.
There is an academic bent to this book, as might be expected given the author's background, and the text drips with some vehemence, indignation and stridency, which is understandable when one objectively appraises the subject matter. The translation into English (if indeed it was translated into English) is not 100 percent perfect, but this is not a major drawback.
Much of the material which has been in the mass media about "Gladio" has concentrated on its highly visible and dramatic manifestations in Italy between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, with also some attention given to events in Belgium and Germany. Ganser's work provides a more broad, all-encompassing view of the saga, looking at the less publicized facets of the scheme. We also gain an idea of the attitudes at national, European and NATO level, and the differing reactions of those kept out of the loop, and those who had been privy to details, and feared exposure and scrutiny.
There is little scope for levity in an expose of Gladio, but there is a certain grim humour to the efforts of the former Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, who after being nudged into publicly disclosing the existence of the networks, then decided to stress the involvement or complicity of other Western governments and officials. We are told of the often comically contradictory and obtuse answers given by officials at Nato and elsewhere, when questioned about Gladio.
This book benefits from using a wide and varied range of sources, from officials, researchers, journalists, participants and so forth. One can argue that this approach limits the prospect of a plague of disinformation and sensationalism. I found myself mentally sifting through the welter of claims and allegations, methodically deciding which were more credible than others.
There is a revealing and detailed explanation of the origins of the secret networks, linking them to projects already initiated during the war, primarily those overseen by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Some effort is made to place the advent of Gladio in its historical and geopolitical contexts. The book format is more conducive to a comprehensive look at the motivations for setting up the structures, and how they developed and evolved. Audio-visual accounts often look and feel disjointed and nebulous, zeroing in on the eye-opening and blatantly insidious aspects, and not necessarily capturing the essence of the big picture. Ganser manages to join some of the dots, also outlining the Nato co-ordination mechanisms with valuable clarity.
A few insinuations are made about the the British and American attitude to Communism, vis-a-vis the Third Reich, which many will find contentious, but they are difficult to ignore. Nato's Secret Armies is quite uncompromising in that respect.
Cutting through everything for me is a hunch that the original Gladio "stay behind" forces would have been ineffectual and inadequate anyway. They only became truly sinister and potent when the emphasis changed from the "resistance" role to that of domestic subversion and manipulation. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the latter was the main intention all along. The pressure being exerted by the initiative's main sponsors seemed to indicate that this was the case.
Sensibly, the work proceeds to divide itself into chapters addressing the operations and events in each country. It almost doubles as a kind of potted history of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. The shadowy figures, the abuses and malpractice, and the unsavoury regimes allegedly propped up and tolerated by our so-called democracies. The salutary cases of Chile and Algeria come under the microscope.
As I worked my way through Nato's Secret Armies, it increasingly occurred to me how bankrupt and bereft of moral self-confidence the Western powers must have been, when they felt the need to indulge in such chicanery, even as an adjunct to other propaganda. Clearly the merits of peaceful and honest ideas were not deemed totally sufficient to dissuade people from embracing Communism.
One of the most poignant parts of the account of the early days of Gladio is the extent to which some European statesmen had to compromise their liberal, democratic principles and acquiesce in the project. Their reliance on American economic and military aid presumably ensured this. At that stage, expediency must have overridden almost everything else. Desperate times, and all that?
Can it be argued that the basic "stay behind" concept in itself was sensible and sound from a strategic and military standpoint, and that the flaw in its implementation was the lack of democratic or parliamentary oversight and control? Was it realistic to expect that such supervision could have been undertaken, in the paranoid and insecure post-war period? It is clear that the Americans in particular did not trust everybody to be furnished with details of the covert operations. Consequently the imperatives of secrecy and Cold War expediency won out. The ends justify the means?
It must also be asked whether all the terror, subversion and manipulation actually made any difference to public opinion, and the political climate, in the countries concerned. I suppose that it is almost impossible to quantify this, except to point out that the "status quo" prevailed, but was this in spite of rather than because of these nefarious activities? Some of the motivation must have stemmed from the powerlessness, desperation even, felt by those in the West, and the sense that they needed to "do something", no matter how dubious in moral and strategic terms. Not that this excuses much of what went on....
The contention that these measures were primarily ideological, rather than based on a cogent assessment of the real strategic situation at the time, is hard to rebut. Many of the organisations which were infiltrated, discredited or marginalised were committed to achieving their practical objectives through peaceful and democratic means. The Italian Communist Party is perhaps the most obvious example. It makes one wonder who the real "democrats" were...
It may be unwise and unfair to pronounce uniform motivations and reasons for the "mutation" of some of the secret armies across Europe. Much of the disquiet has revolved around the recruitment of assorted unedifying figures from the defeated Axis powers. The stated rationale was that these individuals could accomplish Allied aims quickly and efficiently, when needs were pressing. Our old friend Expediency again?
In other places, naivete may have been a factor, the misguided view that these people would not do anything seriously untoward. As a counter-argument, a look at the political inclinations of some of the "stakeholders" should surely have raised the alarm? The need for secrecy, and the web of intrigue spun within the overall network, seems to have ensured that nothing was done.
The worrying thing is that even today a fair percentage of the population would unquestioningly endorse the unethical and murderous measures undertaken during the Gladio years. We should rejoice in the knowledge that we have journalists, authors, researchers and academics who tirelessly strive to extract the truth in such matters. Of course, the odd honest and courageous politician always helps....
Although not perhaps a definitive account of its subject, Nato's Secret Armies is an absorbing and disturbing read.
To summarise, the "Gladio" project stemmed from a desire by Western governments and intelligence services to install a network of "stay behind" agents and operatives in European countries in the aftermath of World War 2 , to provide information and engage in subversive activities in the event of a Soviet/Eastern Bloc invasion. It has been shown that these networks to varying degrees mutated or were co-opted, and turned their belligerence on political opponents, civilians and the fabric of society. "False flag" terrorist attacks were carried out, often by extreme right-wing groups, and were then falsely attributed to the radical left. It would seem that some of those in positions of power, in intelligence services for example, perpetrated cover-ups in order to protect the existence of the "Gladio" system, and also to shield acolytes.
There is an academic bent to this book, as might be expected given the author's background, and the text drips with some vehemence, indignation and stridency, which is understandable when one objectively appraises the subject matter. The translation into English (if indeed it was translated into English) is not 100 percent perfect, but this is not a major drawback.
Much of the material which has been in the mass media about "Gladio" has concentrated on its highly visible and dramatic manifestations in Italy between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, with also some attention given to events in Belgium and Germany. Ganser's work provides a more broad, all-encompassing view of the saga, looking at the less publicized facets of the scheme. We also gain an idea of the attitudes at national, European and NATO level, and the differing reactions of those kept out of the loop, and those who had been privy to details, and feared exposure and scrutiny.
There is little scope for levity in an expose of Gladio, but there is a certain grim humour to the efforts of the former Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, who after being nudged into publicly disclosing the existence of the networks, then decided to stress the involvement or complicity of other Western governments and officials. We are told of the often comically contradictory and obtuse answers given by officials at Nato and elsewhere, when questioned about Gladio.
This book benefits from using a wide and varied range of sources, from officials, researchers, journalists, participants and so forth. One can argue that this approach limits the prospect of a plague of disinformation and sensationalism. I found myself mentally sifting through the welter of claims and allegations, methodically deciding which were more credible than others.
There is a revealing and detailed explanation of the origins of the secret networks, linking them to projects already initiated during the war, primarily those overseen by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Some effort is made to place the advent of Gladio in its historical and geopolitical contexts. The book format is more conducive to a comprehensive look at the motivations for setting up the structures, and how they developed and evolved. Audio-visual accounts often look and feel disjointed and nebulous, zeroing in on the eye-opening and blatantly insidious aspects, and not necessarily capturing the essence of the big picture. Ganser manages to join some of the dots, also outlining the Nato co-ordination mechanisms with valuable clarity.
A few insinuations are made about the the British and American attitude to Communism, vis-a-vis the Third Reich, which many will find contentious, but they are difficult to ignore. Nato's Secret Armies is quite uncompromising in that respect.
Cutting through everything for me is a hunch that the original Gladio "stay behind" forces would have been ineffectual and inadequate anyway. They only became truly sinister and potent when the emphasis changed from the "resistance" role to that of domestic subversion and manipulation. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the latter was the main intention all along. The pressure being exerted by the initiative's main sponsors seemed to indicate that this was the case.
Sensibly, the work proceeds to divide itself into chapters addressing the operations and events in each country. It almost doubles as a kind of potted history of Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. The shadowy figures, the abuses and malpractice, and the unsavoury regimes allegedly propped up and tolerated by our so-called democracies. The salutary cases of Chile and Algeria come under the microscope.
As I worked my way through Nato's Secret Armies, it increasingly occurred to me how bankrupt and bereft of moral self-confidence the Western powers must have been, when they felt the need to indulge in such chicanery, even as an adjunct to other propaganda. Clearly the merits of peaceful and honest ideas were not deemed totally sufficient to dissuade people from embracing Communism.
One of the most poignant parts of the account of the early days of Gladio is the extent to which some European statesmen had to compromise their liberal, democratic principles and acquiesce in the project. Their reliance on American economic and military aid presumably ensured this. At that stage, expediency must have overridden almost everything else. Desperate times, and all that?
Can it be argued that the basic "stay behind" concept in itself was sensible and sound from a strategic and military standpoint, and that the flaw in its implementation was the lack of democratic or parliamentary oversight and control? Was it realistic to expect that such supervision could have been undertaken, in the paranoid and insecure post-war period? It is clear that the Americans in particular did not trust everybody to be furnished with details of the covert operations. Consequently the imperatives of secrecy and Cold War expediency won out. The ends justify the means?
It must also be asked whether all the terror, subversion and manipulation actually made any difference to public opinion, and the political climate, in the countries concerned. I suppose that it is almost impossible to quantify this, except to point out that the "status quo" prevailed, but was this in spite of rather than because of these nefarious activities? Some of the motivation must have stemmed from the powerlessness, desperation even, felt by those in the West, and the sense that they needed to "do something", no matter how dubious in moral and strategic terms. Not that this excuses much of what went on....
The contention that these measures were primarily ideological, rather than based on a cogent assessment of the real strategic situation at the time, is hard to rebut. Many of the organisations which were infiltrated, discredited or marginalised were committed to achieving their practical objectives through peaceful and democratic means. The Italian Communist Party is perhaps the most obvious example. It makes one wonder who the real "democrats" were...
It may be unwise and unfair to pronounce uniform motivations and reasons for the "mutation" of some of the secret armies across Europe. Much of the disquiet has revolved around the recruitment of assorted unedifying figures from the defeated Axis powers. The stated rationale was that these individuals could accomplish Allied aims quickly and efficiently, when needs were pressing. Our old friend Expediency again?
In other places, naivete may have been a factor, the misguided view that these people would not do anything seriously untoward. As a counter-argument, a look at the political inclinations of some of the "stakeholders" should surely have raised the alarm? The need for secrecy, and the web of intrigue spun within the overall network, seems to have ensured that nothing was done.
The worrying thing is that even today a fair percentage of the population would unquestioningly endorse the unethical and murderous measures undertaken during the Gladio years. We should rejoice in the knowledge that we have journalists, authors, researchers and academics who tirelessly strive to extract the truth in such matters. Of course, the odd honest and courageous politician always helps....
Although not perhaps a definitive account of its subject, Nato's Secret Armies is an absorbing and disturbing read.
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