Even now, the 1975 European Cup Final in Paris, contested by Leeds United and Bayern Munich, has quite a surreal, nebulous aura about it. I was only five years old at the time, and it was shortly after this that my boyhood interest in the beautiful game began to blossom. Re-watching the game, one senses a kind of pallor over the whole event, as if it was presaging the dark days ahead for Leeds United, and in a sense for the game in general.
Leeds were already in decline, and looking towards a rebuilding process, only finishing ninth in the domestic league table in that Spring of '75. The team had moved on, but there was still unfinished business for the players schooled by Don Revie. Retrospectively, it almost resembles a ceremonial obligation which had to be staged before the club could truly move on.
It has been suggested that Jimmy Armfield felt obliged to give the Revie players the chance to play in this match, with the result that the talented young Duncan McKenzie was restricted to a place on the bench. Who knows whether this was pure sentiment, or a case of going for experience? It is undeniable that several of the key players of the Revie era were showing the signs of ageing and wear and tear, and that the dynamism of yore was lacking, especially in the midfield area.
The notion that the choice of the starting eleven was based on tactical considerations is strengthened by the presence of Terry Yorath in midfield, to the exclusion of Eddie Gray. Justified in the context of this particular match and the opposition, but somehow out of kilter with the tenor of the evening from a Leeds supporter's viewpoint.
In appraising the evening's events, it is also worth referring to the mundane and unthreatening line-up which Bayern fielded. With star players in decline, Paul Breitner gone to Madrid, and some prosaic performers elsewhere in the team, the reality was much less formidable than the reputation. In fact, there may be a case for arguing that in the mid-1970s European football had slipped somewhat from the lofty glories of Total Football and the superb fare served up during the 1974 World Cup.
Leeds appeared to control possession for much of the game, particularly the first forty-five minutes, although the build-up was laboured and ponderous at times. Joe Jordan and Allan Clarke posed real problems for the Bayern defence with their movement and athleticism. In the midfield area Leeds were solid if unspectacular, providing a robust platform rather than a launchpad for audacious runs.
The Leeds strategy was circumspect, but it seemed to be succeeding up to a point. The forwards and the midfield screen were working tirelessly, and Bayern were extracting little change from the Leeds back line. The Leeds passing was measured but usually accurate, and the Yorkshire side seemed to be edging the physical dimension of the contest too. It is true that Leeds were playing deep, maybe a consequence of the team selection, and of the respect which they felt for their opponents.
The more often I watch it, the more blatant the Beckenbauer trip on Clarke becomes. Though this must have caused frustration, Leeds continued to probe and generally dictate proceedings. Even after the disallowed "goal" in the second half, Leeds initially seemed outwardly unaffected. Whether the first Bayern goal was the consequence of Leeds being rattled or distracted, who can say. It looked like a simple defensive lapse, but did subconscious disaffection play a role? By the time Gerd Muller scored the second, the match had become bitty and fragmented, and it is possible that Leeds had had time to dwell on the injustice of it all.
I was too young at the time to absorb fully the match and its aftermath and implications, but I can imagine the emptiness which all those connected with Leeds must have felt. The party was well and truly over, in more ways than one....
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